Abstract: With IPSec/VPN policies being widely deployed, how to correctly specify and configure them is critical in enforcing security requirements. Under current practice, IPSec/VPN policies are usually specified manually by system administrators and thus prone to errors. However, dynamic aspects in the network may interfere with the existing policy set up and thus cause unexpected conflict. To deal with these problems, we formally define IPSec security requirements, policies, and their correctness criteria.
Introduction
The Internet has become increasingly more and more dynamic in many aspects. With the capability of various wireless network technologies, users and even sub-networks can be mobile. Mobility implies potential changes in the policies or the inter-relations among distributed policies. Adaptive security is another cause of policy changes. It will be common in the near future for a security management system to react to a newly detected intrusion, by on-the-fly determining to strengthen the security level by modifying the IPSec security policies. Usually an IPSec policy rule consists of two parts: condition and action; if the condition part is met, then the action part will be enforced. The values in the IP header fields are mapped to condition part as one traffic selector, while the action part specifies how to handle the traffic flow that fits the selector. However, IPSec/VPN policies are manually configured to individual security gateways or administrative domains in current practice, which could be very inefficient and error-prone. Small or subtle errors in the process as shown in the scenarios below may manifest themselves as massive holes in the overall security of the network. In addition, the interactions among policies can cause unexpected security breaches, which are very difficult to check even with careful and experienced administrators.
− IPSec policy conflicts: between Privacy Protection and Content Examination
As shown in Fig 2, A and B built an encryption tunnel to protect their sensitive communication, while the other policy, on Security Gateway SG-1, is specified to deny any ESP encrypted packets. Therefore, all packets will be dropped in the middle of the transmission. (2) and (3), SG-1 will perform access control such that only the traffic from A to B will be allowed. The problem, though, is that the authentication tunnel between A and SG-2 will change the packet header such that the destination IP address appears to be SG-2 at SG-1. Therefore, according to Policy (3), all packets from A to B will be dropped, which is not the original intention of the system administrator. (1) specifies that all traffic from A to B must be encrypted through a tunnel from SG-1.1 to SG-2, while Policy (2) defines all traffic from A to B must be encrypted through a tunnel from SG-1 to SG-2.1. With this configuration, traffic is encapsulated with a new header by SG-1.1 and then encapsulated with another new header by SG-1 to send to SG-2.1. When SG-2.1 decapsulates and finds out the destination is SG-2, SG-2.1 will send traffic back to SG-2. Finally, SG-2 will decapsulate 4 and send traffic to its real destination. Although it is originally intended to encrypt traffic from SG-2 to SG-2.1, the traffic is eventually sent in clear text from SG-2 to SG-2.1 because of tunnel interaction.
The three scenarios above show that the interaction of a set of policies can lead to conflicts that deviate from the original intention. This illustrates two fundamental issues in IPSec policy management: 1) How to systematically determine the correct set of policies and securely distribute them across the network? 2) How to ensure the correctness of a set of distributed security policies?
In this paper, we briefly present formal definitions for security requirements and policies from our previous work and solutions to automatically generate a set of correct IPSec/VPN policies given a set of requirements on an end-to-end single flow. Then in section 3, we introduce the BANDS architecture together with an improved Ordered-Split algorithm. This provides a solution with the minimum of tunnels.
With the automated generation and correctness analysis algorithms, it is thus feasible to adaptively change the security configuration of a network system due to re-configuration, upgrades, faults/intrusions, or even mobility. We present our simulation results and analysis in Section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the paper and outlines future work.
Security requirements and policies
In our previous work [10] [11] [12] , we demonstrated that in order to provide a solution to ensure the correctness of the security policies, there is a need [1] [2] to clearly and rigorously distinguish the higherlevel policies (i.e. security requirements [5] ) and low-level specific plans (i.e. security policies [3] [4] to meet the objective). One important task of IPSec policy management [2] is to represent security requirements at a high level efficiently and unambiguously. We will briefly outline the formal definitions of security requirements in Section 2.1, which readers can refer [12] for more details.
Security requirement categorizations
In order to have a fine-grain analysis of the requirements, we further categorize security requirements into four different types in the tunnel from ip src at port src to ip dst at port dst will be denied by router 1 and router 2 , and thus indicate that the traffic flow needs to be accessed/examined by these two routers.
Figure 5 Security Requirement Categories
Therefore, with the requirement definitions established, a policy can be set up to satisfy a requirement as follows. Basically, a policy includes a traffic selector and a certain action to be taken for the traffic that fits the selector. Formal definitions are defined in the next section.
Security Requirement and Policy Definitions
Definition 2.2.1: IPSec/VPN policy can be specified at two different levels: the requirement-level security policies (or security requirements in short) and the implementation level security policies (or security implementation policies in short). They are the same in basic form as defined below but different in attributes and semantics that will be defined respectively. In the condition part, each i S is a finite set:
• "flow identity" is composed of 5 sub-selectors: src addr , dst addr , src port , dst port , protocol to identify the original flow, regardless of the encapsulated IP headers of the packet.
In the action part, each j t is a finite set:
• "sec_function" is to specify the security function(s) required for certain traffic, in which AUTH specifies the requirement to authenticate the whole IP packet and ENC specifies the requirement to encrypt the payload of the IP packet 4 .
• "strength" is to specify desired level of security protection such as ordinary, middle or high;
optionally algorithm specifies the algorithm desired for the security protection;
• "from to" is to specify the areas outside the "from to" sets are to be protected from when the traffic flow is routed from "from" to "to". Optionally, trusted_nodes specifies the nodes that are allowed to access content while a packet is being protected. An empty trusted_nodes list implies there must be a direct tunnel starting at the "from" node and ending at the "to" node.
• "sec_function access_nodes" is to specify the condition that certain security functions (e.g. authentication or encryption) are applied against particular nodes specified by the finite set access_nodes, which can be used in representing the Content Access Requirement of certain nodes by 1 Flow id (a.k.a. flow identity) can be represented as a 5-tuple including source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port and protocol. 2 Attribute with [ ] is optional and can be specified to be empty. 3 Each attribute is a finite set, which can be specified as wildcard, prefix, a list of values, ranges etc.
7
denying certain security function(s) to protect from them.
• "SA_peer 1 SA_peer 2 " is to specify that any node in the set of SA_peer 1 forms Security Association (SA) with any node in the set of SA_peer 2 . Security Association is a description of how two network entities will use security services to communicate security, thus the Security Association Requirement is represented by explicitly denying/allowing particular nodes to build an association relationship with certain security function at certain strength.
The requirement definition above is capable of specifying four types of security requirements and is extensible for new security requirements in the future.
Definition 2.2.6:
The implementation level IPSec security policies check various header fields of incoming packets to select a packet. Therefore, policies have selectors from IP header fields of a specific incoming IP packet in the condition part as:
and have the following action types and associated parameters in the action part:
deny, allow, or ipsec_action (sec_prot, algorithm 5 , mode, fromA, toA)
In the condition part, each i S is a finite set to match the header fields of a packet to the policy.
In the action part, each j t is a single value except algorithm:
• "sec_prot" specifies either AH or ESP;
• "algorithm" specifies all possible algorithms for IKE to negotiate;
• "mode" specifies either transport or tunnel;
• "fromA toA" specify two enforcement agents to build an SA.
The specification follows the definition of SPSL [6] in IETF.
Requirement Satisfaction
Given a set of requirement R, a set of policies are correct if and only if they satisfy all the 5 We use algorithm to abstract other related attributes like key_length etc as well.
8 requirements in R. For clarity, we focus our definitions on requirement satisfaction for single flow only.
One requirement is satisfied only when the requirement is satisfied for every single flow of the specified traffic. With requirements and policies defined above, two approaches were introduced in [11] to automatically generate security policies given a set of requirements. As shown in Fig 7, the Bundle approach is to group traffic flows into different bundles and build tunnels for each traffic bundle, while the Direct approach is to generate policies for each requirement. In both approaches, each requirement will be satisfied by the tunnels built, however, it is easy to see that Bundle approach may produce redundant tunnels as it builds tunnels for each possible flow bundle and the Direct approach builds fewer tunnels and thus is more efficient.
Access Control Requirement

Automatic Policy Generation in an Inter-Domain environment
Given a set of security requirements, the most fundamental issue is to find a policy solution to correctly satisfy the requirements. While our previous work solved the problem in an intra-domain network, we will focus on a wider scope to provide a policy solution for an inter-domain environment. In [10] , a distributed framework/protocol for policy negotiation and generation, using the Direct approach, is introduced. And in [9] , an efficient algorithm for an optimal solution to generate a minimum number of tunnels is presented. In this paper, we will present an integrated solution using the BANDS architecture to discover the security requirements along the route path and use Ordered-Split to automatically generate a solution with the minimum number of tunnels. An improved version of the algorithm, dynamic OrderedSplit algorithm will also be introduced to handle out of order requirements in BANDS. Figure 8 Requirement Server in BANDS architecture Figure 9 The architecture of a requirement server
BANDS Architecture
In an inter-domain network, it is not scalable for a pure centralized management system to collect all the requirements in each domain network and then compute the correct policies accordingly. Therefore, we proposed a hybrid framework using a centralized and a distributed system [10] . In the BANDS architecture, we introduced a requirement server (RS) to each domain (a.k.a. Autonomous System) in the network. The requirement server is responsible for cooperation and policy negotiation with other requirement servers at other domains. As illustrated in Fig 8 , requirement servers execute a two-phase policy negotiation process.
i. Route path discovery
In order to discover the requirement servers along the route path and to involve them in Phase II for the policy negotiation, it is necessary to find out the route path first given a start and end node. Based on the discovered AS route path, each RS in the AS on the path should be able to identify the IP addresses of other servers along the path by using DNS. This phase is to prepare for Phase II for the corresponding requirement servers to exchange information for policy generation. For instance, if BGRP 6 [7] is used under BANDS architecture, the route path discovery starts with a "BGRP PROBE"
message from the initiator to the destination. After a "GRAFT" message is sent back, the exact AS route path has been probed and reserved. 6 BGRP (Border Gateway Reservation Protocol) is an inter-domain aggregated resource reservation protocol for unicast traffic, where a sink tree is built for each of the stub domains to perform a destination-based reservation aggregation.
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ii. Requirement discovery and policy negotiation After the AS route path is probed in Phase I, each RS on the path needs to make queries to its neighbor RS to discover the corresponding requirements for that traffic flow. With the RS architecture shown in Fig 9, the requirement server stores the local requirement information as well as the routing data and existing tunnel information in its MIBs (Management Information Base). To maintain an upto-date copy of data, it needs to periodically update these data from local routers.
Once the server receives all the data it needs, it will invoke the policy negotiation module to calculate policies based on the corresponding requirements. In [10] , we used the Direct approach to automatically generate security policies. However, as this approach may produce extra tunnels, we will use the Ordered-Split algorithm [9] to generate a minimum set of policies.
iii. An example scenario
The example scenario in The basic policy generation algorithm, Direct approach, that BANDS originally adopted, is to build policies for each different security coverage requirement. For example, three IPSec tunnels based on two SCRs are built by RS at AS100 with splitting tunnels that avoid tunnel overlaps and thus potential security violations.
Automatic policy generation: Ordered-Split algorithm
As networks become more complex, the cost for encryption and decryption can greatly impact the communication performance. Thus our approach for automatic IPSec/VPN policy generation will try to generate efficient solutions. Given a set of security requirements, a solution with fewer IPSec tunnels provides a more efficient way to perform cryptographic operations. Therefore, we presented an algorithm [9] to automatically generate policies to satisfy the requirements while also providing an optimal solution with the minimum number of policies. We now present details of the Dynamic Ordered-Split algorithm.
i. Ordered-Split algorithm
The algorithm borrows some concepts from traditional "task scheduling". Given a set of requirements R, we want to find a set of Tunnels T to satisfy the requirements, avoid tunnel overlaps and use the minimum number of tunnels.
13 Fig 11 illustrates the definitions for a requirement, a policy and an overlap. Note that they represent the security requirement and policy just using a start node and an end node, so it is a simpler view.
This simplification is reasonable when we have a linear topology (in [8] we consider more complex topologies). In the full version of [9] , we proved that the Ordered-Split algorithm finds a correct solution using the minimum number of tunnels possible. 7 Tie-free requirements mean that no two requirements share a same FROM value and no two requirements share a same TO value.
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The Ordered-Split algorithm assumes that we know all the security requirements beforehand, so the algorithm starts by sorting the requirements by the FROM values. In a more practical scenario, new requirements may arrive, requiring us to update our policies. Each time a new requirement arrives, we could simply rerun the Ordered-Split algorithm, but this would be quite slow. Instead, the OrderedSplit algorithm can be revised as follows to handle new requirements and only consider necessary changes.
As in [9] we only allow Canonical Solutions: all tunnels start/end at FROM or TO values in R and no two tunnels have the same start time and no two have the same end time. Since we showed in [9] that there is always an optimal solution (minimum number of tunnels, no overlaps, and meets all requirements) which is canonical, it is sufficient to find an optimal canonical solution.
To start with, we assume we have a set of tunnels T for a set of requirements R, such that T is [f, a 1 ], [a 1 , a 2 ] , ..., [a k , t'] starting at f , since T is a canonical solution). See Fig 14. Since no overlaps and the chain doesn't cover (f, t), we either have i) a 1 > t (so first tunnel contains (f, t)) or ii) t' < t (so (f, t) contains the chain). ii). If t' < t, then there could be other chains which start after t' and end at or before t. If no chain ends at t, we can simply add a tunnel [t', t]. Any existing tunnel with overlap would have to overlap [f, t] (contradicting our assumption) or overlap one of the tunnels in the old chain from f. Also, since there is a required chain from f to t' and from f to t, there is a required chain from t' to t. (note that we have jumped over any chains starting after t' but ending before t).
Figure 15 Scenario that adds a new but short tunnel for the new requirement
If a chain ends at t, let f'' be the start of that chain (see Fig 15) . We then build a new tunnel [t', f''] to connect the existing chains starting at f and ending at t. Any old tunnel which overlaps 16 this would overlap [f, t] or a tunnel in one of the two chains being connected.
Also, since we have a required chain from f to t', from f to t and from f'' to t, there must be a chain from t' to f'' in any canonical solution.
III. Else, at least one overlap (note we can still have chains that start/end at f, t): a). Left overlap only with (f, t) (see Fig 16) :
Treat the overlapping tunnel(s) exactly as in the ordered-split algorithm 9 . By construction, the set of tunnels T' is canonical, has no overlaps, and has a tunnel chain for each requirement in R', thus it is a correct canonical solution. Since we showed in [9] that there is always an optimal canonical solution, we need only show that T' has no more tunnels than the optimal canonical solution for R'. We do this by showing that each tunnel [x, y] in T' starts at a required time (so any canonical solution will have a tunnel starting at x), thus T' has the minimum number of tunnels.
By assumption, each tunnel [x, y] in T started at a required time, and adding a requirement never removes such a requirement, so we just need to prove that new tunnels added start at required times.
We show this using a key property proved in [9] .
For a set of requirements R', we must have a tunnel starting at x if either:
a) x is a FROM value of a requirement, or b) x is a TO value for a requirement (f, x) such that either: i). There is an overlapping requirement r = (f', t') with f < f' < x < t' OR ii). For f < f' < x < t' there is a required chain of tunnels from f' to t'.
It is fairly straightforward to show that each new tunnel created when we process our new requirement The example scenario in Fig 18 shows the dynamic Ordered-Split algorithm builds three tunnels for the original two requirements (step 1 -step 2.2) and handles an incoming new requirement by splitting the existing tunnels (step 3.1 -step 3.2).
Simulation results and analysis
We have compared the original Ordered-Split approach versus the Bundle and Direct approach in [9] and our experimental results show that the Ordered-Split algorithm generates a solution with the minimum number of tunnels, as shown in Fig 19 . First we ran both approaches against random generated requirement sets that vary from a single requirement to as many as 500 requirements. As illustrated in Fig 20 1) , the experiments show that the ultimate results for both approaches generate the same number of tunnels (although the tunnels themselves may be different) as they provide an optimal solution with a minimum number of tunnels, respectively.
Secondly, we measured the efficiency of both approaches. As the original Ordered-Split algorithm has to assume that all the requirements are sorted and thus come in order, handling an out of order requirement requires the algorithm to (conceptually) tear down all the existing tunnels and then re-sort the requirements to compute the ultimate tunnel solutions, the time that the approach needs is at least as twice as much spent for computing a set of requirements. On the other hand, the improved OrderedSplit approach could easily handle the out of order requirement and only tear down and break those existing tunnels that may be involved and impacted by this requirement. Therefore, using the improved Ordered-Split algorithm under BANDS architecture is very efficient and provides us a correct and conflict-free tunnel solution with a minimum number of tunnels.
Conclusion
IPSec security policies are widely deployed in firewalls or security gateways to protect information 20 property and how to correctly specify and configure IPSec/VPN policies is critical in enforcing security requirements of an organization. Therefore in this paper, a formal approach towards policy correctness and assurance in an inter-domain network is presented to provide a correct and efficient solution for policy management.
The paper first formally defined IPSec security policies and requirements that are clearly formulated and are conformant to IETF standard specifications. Security policies are correct only if they satisfy all security requirements. Then we formally defined security requirement satisfaction. The formal definitions laid a foundation for a formal proof of security policy correctness.
An inter-domain IPSec/VPN policy management architecture is then introduced to provide a solution that uses a routing protocol to discover the route path first and then collects security requirement information along the path to automatically generate policies. A couple of algorithms to automatically generate correct policies given a set of security requirements can be used under BANDS, including
Bundle/Direct Approach, Ordered-Split Algorithm and Improve Ordered-Split algorithm. Our experiments with improved Ordered-Split algorithm show that it is very efficient to use it with BANDS, as it costs less turn-around time with out-of-order requirements.
Based on our current results, the research can be further conducted in several areas. First, the application of the research to dynamic policy resolution problems (e.g. in mobile environments) requires further study. Second, more levels of polices may be defined until the whole hierarchy is clearly established. 
